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Abstract—Peer-to-Peer IP Television (P2PTV) applications rep-
resent one of the fastest growing application classes on the
Internet, both in terms of their popularity and in terms of the
amount of traffic they generate. While network operators require
monitoring tools that can effectively analyze the traffic produced
by these systems, few techniques have been tested on these mostly
closed-source, proprietary applications.
In this paper we examine the properties of three traffic
classifiers applied to the problem of identifying P2PTV traffic. We
report on extensive experiments conducted on traffic traces with
reliable ground truth information, highlighting the benefits and
shortcomings of each approach. The results show that not only
their performance in terms of accuracy can vary significantly,
but also that their usability features suggest different effective
aspects that can be integrated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet Television is perhaps the most important emerging
application in these days. While services based on traditional
client-server technologies such as Hulu, Miro or (in a broader
sense) YouTube are currently widely used, new applications
are emerging that exploit the peer-to-peer (P2P) paradigm to
broadcast television over the Internet.
However, network operators fear the potential impact that
these application may have on the network, since they can offer
a significant load on the system, which can cause network
congestion and possibly collapse, with the failure of the
P2PTV service itself [1]. Therefore, there is lot of interest
in new techniques capable to monitor the complex traffic
patterns generated by these systems, which unfortunately use
proprietary and undocumented protocols, and are therefore
harder to identify than their open standard counterparts.
This work analyzes the outcome of three traffic identifica-
tion techniques that focus on UDP traffic, which is currently
the most part of the traffic generated by P2PTV applications.
pDPI [16], the first classifier we consider, is based on a
traditional per-packet Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) which
identifies the traffic according to a set of application-layer
regular expressions. The other two techniques exploit more
recent behavioral approaches to traffic classification, based on
supervised machine learning mechanisms that can discrim-
inate traffic according to different properties. In particular
IPSVM [2], the second classifier we test, uses a set of
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simple statistics extracted from the transport-layer headers like
payload length of the first few packets, while KISS [3] derives
statistical description of the application protocol payload by
automatically analyzing the randomness of the first bytes of
the application-layer payload.
The three classifiers are tested considering a common
dataset of traces that include ground truth information, cap-
tured using either the GT suite [19] or setting up experiments
in controlled environments. This allows us to test the classi-
fication accuracy of each technique, and its robustness with
respect to different protocols, trace capture time and location.
Overall, the three approaches show strengths and weak-
nesses in different areas. While all of them can achieve satisfy-
ing accuracy in terms of true positives, both pDPI and IPSVM
can, under some circumstances, be affected by relatively large
false negatives (up to 78.1% and 27.7% of flows, respectively),
whereas KISS shows higher false positives than the other two
approaches (up to 24.9% of flows). In terms of usability, pDPI
suffers from requiring manual generation of the signatures,
while KISS and IPSVM can be trained almost automatically.
This paper presents an extensive analysis of the properties of
the three classifiers summarizing the main aspects in Table VI.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is among the firsts
that explicitly consider the classification of traffic generated by
closed source, P2P-based IPTV applications. To help the re-
search community to conduct fair and repeatable experiments,
the datasets, the source code of the classifiers and supporting
tools used in this paper are made available on their respective
web pages or upon request.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
discusses related work. We introduce the three classifiers in
Section III and we describe the datasets used in our experi-
ments in Section IV. We analyze the experimental results in
Section V, finally Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This paper focuses on P2PTV traffic classification, compar-
ing the accuracy and the completeness of different classifiers
on traces that include ground truth information. These three
aspects have been separately studied in a few recent works,
but to the best of our knowledge, no papers are available that
provide a complete analysis, focusing on all these aspects.
In the scientific community there is an increasing attention
to P2PTV traffic, and several authors have investigated their
behavior in real network (see [4], [5], [6] as examples).
However, the issue of identifying the traffic generated by these
applications is an unexplored field, with the only exception
of [7] in which authors explicitely target P2PTV applications.
The second goal of this paper, i.e. the fair comparison
among the results of different traffic classifiers, is evaluated
only in a few recent works. The reason is that well-accepted
methodologies do not exist to compare classifiers that differ
in many aspects and furthermore the source code of most
classifiers has not been released to the scientific community.
Among the few papers that evaluate this aspect, [8] presents
a comparison between a behavioral host-based classifier [9]
and flow-based systems using different supervised machine
learning mechanisms. In [10] the authors show a comparative
analysis of the accuracy of different classifiers: port-based,
DPI and based on machine learning techniques. Several works
like [11], [12] and [13] compare the accuracy of different
supervised and un-supervised algorithms that use the same
information and features extracted from the flows.
The third point, i.e. the accuracy of the classification of
traffic traces used as baseline, has been a weak point of many
papers on this topic. For example, [10] combines different
identification systems and information related to users, hosts
and specific application behavior, e.g., P2P-networks. Often,
DPI is used to derive ground truth, although nobody knows
exactly the accuracy of this technology which is highly de-
pendent on the pattern matching rules used [14].
III. TRAFFIC CLASSIFICATION TECHNIQUES
This Section briefly presents the three classifiers under ex-
amination. Readers interested in a more detailed presentation
of the classifiers and a discussion about the parameter settings
can refer to [16], [2], [3]. For a brief overview of the main
properties of the three classifiers, refer to Table VI.
Since each classifier operates on different entities, we sum-
marize here the most important concepts that are required
for understanding their operations. An endpoint is the tuple
(IP address, UDP port) that identifies a single host in the
network running a particular application on a given UDP port.
A flow is a sequence of packets at transport level that create a
bi-directional communication between two endpoints. A flow
(endpoint) is identified when an UDP segment is observed for
the first time. All segments having then the same identifier,
depending on IP addresses and UDP ports, belong to the
same flow (endpoint). Finally, a flow (endpoint) is considered
terminated when no segments are observed from more than an
idle time that we set to 60 (300) seconds1.
Both pDPI and IPSVM operate on a per-flow basis, while
KISS operates on endpoints. A simple strategy is used to
propagate the endpoint labels at the flow level: given a flow,
when the same label is associated to both the source and
destination endpoints, the flow is tagged with such label. In
case a different label is associated to the two endpoints, the
flow is marked as unknown (implementing then a conservative
algorithm).
1The setting of the timeout values is not critical when dealing with P2PTV
applications given the large number of packets they generate when active.
A. pDPI
A DPI classifier relies on the observation that each appli-
cation uses specific protocol headers to initiate and/or control
the data exchange, which can be captured by a signature that
usually comes under the form of a regular expression.
Among the several flavors of DPI classifiers, the most
common implementations operate either on packets or on
application-layer messages. While the message-based variant
appears to be more precise (and in fact it is extensively used
in network security applications), it is more complex because
it may require an additional phase of segments reassembly
and IP de-fragmentation to rebuild the original application-
layer message. Furthermore some studies [15], [16] suggest
that its results are roughly equivalent to the ones obtained by
a simpler packet-based approach in case of regular traffic. For
this reason this paper considers a traditional packet-based DPI
classifier (in short pDPI).
B. IPSVM
The IPSVM classifier [2] is based on the Single-class SVM
proposed in [17]. This classifier requires a training phase to
automatically derive, for each considered protocol, a statistical
model, which is then used during the classification phase.
For each flow we extract a sample represented by the vector
X = (x1, x2, ..., xd) of d values corresponding to the features,
i.e. the statistical quantities chosen to discriminate the flows
generated by different applications. As features we used the
length of the UDP payload of the first d segments of each flow,
and their transmission direction (initiator toward the responder
or vice versa). During the training phase, for each class, a
given number v of vectors X of each considered protocol is
fed to the SVM machine, which automatically calculates the
statistical model. The optimal values of d and v that needs
to be consider for a proper classification are automatically
calculated in the training phase; in our case, they were set as
d = 2 and v = 1000.
During the classification phase, the vector X relative to the
flow under examination is fed to the trained SVM machine.
The IPSVM classifier tries then to assign each sample to the
proper class by finding the highest similarity cost; in case the
similarly cost falls below a given rejection threshold (specific
for each protocol and derived in the training phase) the session
is assigned to the unknown class.
C. KISS
The KISS classifier [3] is based on a multi-class SVM that
exploits a chi-square like test to extract statistical features from
the first application-layer payload bytes. Considering the first
N segments that are sent (or received) by an endpoint, the first
k bytes of the payload are split into groups of bits of the same
size. For each group, the empirical distribution of values taken
by the N samples is computed, and its randomness is derived
using a chi-square like test, which calculates the distance
between the observed distribution and a uniform distribution
used as a reference. This allows to easily characterize the
randomness of the values taken by a considered group of bits,
since constant/random values, counters, etc. are characterized
by different values of the chi-square test. The array of k chi-
square values defines the fingerprint of the protocol.
In this paper we used the first k = 12 bytes of the
UDP payload divided into groups of 4 bits (i.e., 24 features
per vector); the chi-square test is computed after N = 80
packets. A multi-class SVM model is used as decision process.
During the training phase, for each considered protocols, 300
signatures are used to automatically train the SVM machine.
See [3] for a discussion on parameter settings.
An additional class must be also considered that character-
izes the remaining protocols, i.e., the unknown class. In fact,
a multi-class SVM machine will always assign a sample to
one of the known classes, which will be the best one found
in the decision process. Therefore, the trace used to train the
unknown class should include all protocols but the targeted
P2PTV ones.
IV. DATA SET
A. Traffic Traces
In this paper we evaluate three of the most widespread
P2PTV applications as benchmarking dataset: PPLive, Sopcast
and Tvants. We focus only on UDP since the current version
of KISS cannot support TCP. Furthermore, most of P2PTV
traffic relies on UDP, e.g., in our traces UDP accounts for
88%, 100% and 30% of bytes for PPLive, Sopcast and Tvants
respectively.
We compared the three classifiers using four datasets of
traffic traces, whose main characteristics are summarized in
Table I. The VMware (VM) data sets was collected between
Dec. 2008 and Jan. 2009 using a set of VMware virtual
machines running Windows XP on which the three target
applications were scheduled synchronously: every hour all the
machines run the same application tuned on same TV channel
for 45 minutes followed by 15 minutes of silence to purge
all opened connections. Using this approach, we obtained
8 captures per application every day. In addition, all the
virtual machines had the Skype client turned on, while Emule
and BitTorrent clients (with protocol obfuscation enabled)
were active only on one machine. The virtual machines were
installed on a single server inside the Politecnico di Torino
network while the aggregated traces were collected at the
border gateway that connects the campus LAN to the Internet.
The napa-IT and napa-PL sets have been collected on the
4th of April, 2008 at the Politecnico di Torino and Warsaw
University of Technology respectively, in the context of the
Napa-Wine project [1]. Napa-Wine is an European project in
which large scale experiments are periodically organized to
study the behavior of the P2PTV applications. Similar to the
previous case, several (real) Windows XP hosts were used to
run each P2PTV applications in isolation, and to collect traffic.
Since the VM and napa experiments are spaced by eight
months and both PPLive and Tvants automatically update
theirs clients to the last released version, different versions of
the software (and possibly protocols) are present, which was
used to determine the robustness of the various techniques with
Fig. 1. The GT architecture.
respect to an application update. Table II reports the precise
application version number used. Table III summarizes the
volumes of captured traffic for both VM and napa datasets.
Finally, the operator trace contains real traffic collected in
May 2006 at a large ISP PoP located in Turin, Italy2. The PoP
aggregates more than 2000 users using different technologies,
e.g., VoIP phones, set-top-boxes, PCs, etc., and running any
applications, e.g., file sharing applications, web browsing,
gaming, viruses, etc. Since at that time P2PTV applications
were not popular at all in Italy, these traces do not contain
P2PTV traffic and hence they can be used to analyze the
capabilities of the classifiers in terms of false positives. We
verified this assumption by a manual inspection of the traces.
B. Protocol ground truth
The availability of the ground truth for each data set
is perhaps the most critical problem when analyzing traffic
classifiers [15].
The ground truth for the VM traces has been derived
using the GT framework [19], [20], which is a software that
associates accurate ground truth information to traffic traces.
Figure 1 depicts the configuration schema used to extract the
ground truth, which requires a GT daemon running on each
monitored host. The daemon is able to intercept any event
related to the creation/destruction of a socket and associate it
to the owning application. Then, the corresponding network
information (IP addresses, UDP ports) and the application
name are stored into a SQL database. A packet capture engine
co-located with the network’s border gateway creates dump
traces at the same time. Packet traces are then correlated to the
metadata stored in the SQL database using the ipclass [20]
tool in a post-processing phase.
A set of output traces are then created, separating the
packets with respect to the application that generated them.
Due to the polling mechanism used by GT, a limited amount
of traffic (7% of flows and the 12% of bytes) is not labelled
and is therefore excluded from our analysis.
Since the GT framework was not yet available when the
napa trace was captured, the ground truth for these traces has
been obtained by removing all the standard protocols (dns,
ntp, . . . ) from the traces. Since each machine had no daemons
(except for unavoidable systems services) or other applications
2The name of the ISP is not reported for privacy reasons.
Trace | Durat. | Flows | Bytes | Endps
VM | 75 h | 6.1 M | 65.5 G | 606 k
napa-IT (N1) | 3 h | 68 k | 1 G | 19 k
napa-PL (N2) | 3 h | 61 k | 1 G | 17 k
operator (OP) | 10 m | 101 k | 478 M | 17 k
TABLE I
DATASETS USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS (UDP
TRAFFIC ONLY).
Software | VM | napa
PPlive | 2.16 | 1.9.21
Tvants | 1.1 | 1.0.0.59
Sopcast | 3.0.3 | 3.0.3
TABLE II
P2PTV DATA SETS
SOFTWARE VERSIONS
VM napa-IT (N1) napa-PL (N2)
flows bytes flows bytes flows bytes
PPlive 1.0 M 24.5 G 27 k 168 M 30 k 592 M
Tvants 3.5 k 1.1 G 8 k 249 M 8 k 189 M
Sopcast 201 k 30.4 G 34 k 626 M 24 k 297 M
Emule 183 k 55 M - - - -
Skype 4.1 M 2.4 G - - - -
BitTorrent 33 k 14 M - - - -
nolabel 422 k 8.1 G - - - -
summary 6.1 M 65.5 G 69 k 1.0 G 62 k 1.1 G
TABLE III
DATA SETS GROUND TRUTH.
running in background and a single P2PTV application was
executed at each time, all remaining traffic has been assumed
as generated by the target applications. We verified this
speculation by manually inspecting a set of randomly selected
flows and by further analyzing this trace with a pDPI classifier.
Finally, since the operator traces had no P2PTV traffic, we
labelled all the flows as unknown.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This Section presents the procedure used for comparing the
completeness (in terms of traffic volume) and the accuracy
of the three classifiers under examination when analyzing the
same traffic traces. Results are then compared with the ground
truth in terms of volume of traffic (bytes) and number of flows.
We developed an ad-hoc tool for this purpose
(diffinder [21]) that can generate either aggregated
statistics (e.g. number of concordance/discordance between
two classifiers) or produce the complete list of flows classified
differently for further analysis. Since the classifiers may have
different granularity (e.g., a DPI can differentiate between
HTTP 1.0 and 1.1) and in general the name of the application-
layer protocol may be different in the various classifiers, the
tool uses a mapping file to compare the results.
The signatures used by pDPI have been derived by reverse
engineering the NAPA traces, which are the oldest traces with
P2PTV traffic. Vice versa, the statistical model for IPSVM and
KISS has been generated using the VM set.
A. Completeness of classified traffic
While the pDPI classifier is potentially able to classify a
session by inspecting the first packet, IPSVM and KISS may
require a larger number of packets. In fact, IPSVM for each
flow uses the features extracted from the first d packets of
the flow itself, with d = 2 in our case. Consequently, all
flows lasting only one packet cannot be classified by IPSVM.
Instead, KISS needs 80 packets per each endpoint to create its
signature, which means that endpoints generating less then
80 packets cannot be classified. On the other hand, once
properly trained, KISS can classify incoming flows as soon
as it analyzes the first packet, provided that the associated
endpoint is already known. Additionally, KISS can classify
established sessions, while both pDPI and IPSVM cannot
because they analyze the first packets of the session.
Table IV reports the amount of traffic (in terms of flows and
bytes) that remains unclassified in IPSVM and KISS because
of these limitations. While the percentage of unclassifiable
traffic is definitely limited with both tecniques, it is interesting
to note that PPLive has a large amount of short sessions that
last only one packet, which generate a fair high number of
unclassifiable flows with IPSVM but whose impact in terms
of bytes is negligible. This does not affect KISS thanks to
its peculiar endpoint aggregation, although the constraint of
having 80 packets seems to be more sensible in case of the
operator trace, which contains many endpoints generating less
than 80 packets. Also in this case, however, the impact in terms
of bytes is definitely limited.
The next Section, that will be dedicated to the analysis of
the accuracy, will not consider the unclassifiable traffic.
B. Accuracy
The confusion matrix reported in Table V shows the clas-
sification accuracy of the three classifiers. Columns report the
percentages of flows (%f) and bytes (%b) of the evaluation set
associated by the three classifiers to the classes, while rows
correspond to the ground truth labels and are grouped by data
set. The percentages in bold are the true positives and the true
negatives correctly associated by the classifiers.
The column labeled as “un” refers to the unknown traffic
and reports the percentage of traffic that does not match
any signature for the pDPI, or the traffic whose statistical
IPSVM KISS
%Flows %Bytes %Flows %Bytes
VM
PPlive 47.6 0.3 0.2 -
Tvants 1.3 - - -
Sopcast 3.0 - 0.1 -
napa-IT
PPlive 76.7 2.4 0.2 -
Tvants 1.2 - 1.3 -
Sopcast 3.6 - 1.2 -
napa-PL
PPlive 55.5 0.7 - -
Tvants 0.2 - 2.9 0.1
Sopcast 1.7 - - -
operator other 33.6 0.8 9.4 0.7
TOTAL 7.1 0.1 0.4 -
TABLE IV
TRAFFIC THAT IPSVM AND KISS CANNOT CLASSIFY.
pDPI IPSVM KISS
pp tv sp ot un pp tv sp un pp tv sp un
%f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b %f %b
VM
pp 12.8 0.3 - - - - 9.1 98.2 78.1 1.5 92.1 89.8 - - - - 7.8 10.2 100 100 - - - - - -
tv - - 100 100 - - - - - - - - 98.7 99.7 - - 1.3 0.3 - - 100 100 - - - -
sp - - - - 91.7 96.0 4.5 3.9 3.8 0.1 - - - - 87.9 96.3 12.1 3.7 - - - - 100 100 - -
em - - - - - - 63.0 62.3 37.0 37.7 - - - 0.1 - - 100 99.9 - - - - - - 100 100
sk - - - - - - 98.9 97.8 1.1 2.2 0.2 0.2 - - - - 99.8 99.7 - - - - - - 100 100
bt - - - - - - 99.7 99.8 0.3 0.2 1.4 3.9 - - - - 98.6 96.1 - - - - - - 100 100
N1
pp 99.6 100 - - - - 0.4 - - - 72.0 7.6 0.1 - 0.2 0.3 27.7 92.0 97.3 4.4 - - - - 2.7 95.6
tv - - 94.1 100 - - 5.7 - 0.2 - 0.3 - 95.0 94.2 - - 4.7 5.8 - - 98.3 100 - - 1.7 -
sp - - - - 85.4 90.7 11.2 9.3 3.5 - - - - - 98.1 99.3 1.8 0.7 - - - - 99.8 100 0.2 -
N2
pp 100 100 - - - - - - - - 83.6 3.5 0.1 0.1 - - 16.3 96.4 95.6 4.2 - - - - 4.4 95.8
tv - - 100 100 - - - - - - - - 98.9 96.2 - - 1.1 3.8 - - 100 100 - - - -
sp - - - - 60.8 80.5 36.5 19.4 2.7 - - - - - 99.2 99.9 0.8 0.1 - - - - 100 100 - -
OP ot - - - - - - 93.2 99.3 6.8 0.7 0.2 - 0.1 0.1 - - 99.7 99.9 24.9 1.3 0.2 34.0 0.4 0.2 74.5 64.5
pp = PPLive, tv = TVAnts, sp = Sopcast, ot = Other, un = Unknown, em = eMule, sk = Skype, bt = Bittorrent
VM = vmware, N1 = napawine-polito, N2 = napawine-poland, OP = operator
TABLE V
ACCURACY OF PDPI, IPSVM, KISS, IN BOLD THE TRUE POSITIVES AND THE TRUE NEGATIVES.
fingerprint is different from the classes derived in the traning
phase in case of IPSVM and KISS. The pDPI has one more
column labeled as “ot”, which reports the traffic that has been
classified3 but it does not belong to the three P2PTV protocols
under examination.
Table V shows that the accuracy of pDPI in case of napa
traces (N1 and N2) was pretty high with PPLive (“pp”) and
TVAnts (“tv”), while the result with Sopcast (“sp”) is less
satisfying. Further analysis revealed that this traffic was mostly
associated to Skype, suggesting that a refinement of both
signatures is needed. Results are different when considering
the VM traces, which show a dramatic decline in the accuracy
for PPLive. The reason is that the two datasets have been
generated using two different versions of the PPLive client
and the protocol resulted so different that the precision of
the pDPI signature was compromised. Interesting, this effect
was not noticeable in case of TVAnts traffic, although we
used two different versions of the TVAnts client as well. No
false positives were detected by pDPI in our tests, also in the
operator (OP) traces, as expected.
The IPSVM classifier appears to be very accurate on the VM
dataset, with correct results always above 89.8% (in terms of
bytes) and a limited number of false positives. Although the
training was done on the VM dataset, the accuracy is high also
on the napa traces except for the PPLive traffic; the two clients
generated traffic with different statistical properties that lead to
misclassify the vast majority of traffic (in bytes). Interestingly,
results are better in terms of flows, which seems to suggest that
at least some signalling portions of the protocol are roughtly
equivalent in the two clients. Finally, the very limited amount
of false positives (in all traces) suggests that the classifier is
robust with respect to non-P2PTV applications.
KISS appears to produce the best results among the clas-
3The pDPI classifier used the June 2009 version of the NetPDL protocol
database that included 72 application-level protocols (39 over TCP, 25 over
UDP and 8 that operate with both TCP and UDP).
sifiers under testing. It reaches 100% accuracy on the VM
dataset and nearly 100% also on the napa datasets except
for the PPLive traffic, similarly to IPSVM (i.e. many flows,
but limited amount of bytes correcly classified). However, it
appears to be the worst classifier on the operator trace, with
a non-negligible number of false positives. This is due to a
peculiar characteristic of KISS, which defines an explicit class
for the unknown traffic. Since the training was completed on
the VM trace and the unknown class included only eMule,
Skype and BitTorrent (which represent a limited subset of the
protocols present in real traffic), the completeness of this class
is limited and influences the accuracy when the traffic under
examination is substantially different from the training set.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
At the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work
that compares the accuracy and the completeness of different
traffic classifiers applied to P2PTV traffic, and uses traces that
include reliable ground truth information.
The classifiers under examination are extremely different,
starting from the classification method (either exact or statisti-
cal), the different information used in the classification (from
packet sizes to application-level data), and the different base
units (flows and endpoints). Table VI summarizes their overall
properties and main pros and cons.
In particular, the “traditional” pDPI is still very effective
thanks to the fact that these applications do not use en-
cryption or obfuscation techniques. Its main problem is the
process of deriving the signatures that is still manual, time-
consuming and error-prone. IPSVM and KISS replace the
signature database with a more convenient automatic training
phase and they guarantee excellent results if the training set
is appropriate.
Problems appear when the training set differs from the
inspected traffic (e.g. the case of KISS on the operator traffic,
or both KISS and IPSVM with PPLive on the napa traces), but
Technique Features Aggregation Decision Training Pros Cons
pDPI Deep Packet
Inspection
Regular
expressions
on L7 payload
Flow Pattern
matching
Manual,
difficult
Well accepted
Higher completeness
Cannot work on en-
crypted traffic
IPSVM Header-based
statistics
Length of packets Flow SVM Automatic Easy training; Can work
on encrypted traffic
Higher false negatives
KISS Stochastic
Packet
Inspection
Stochastic descrip-
tion of L7 payload
Endpoint SVM Automatic Easy training
Higher true positives
Require training for the
“unknown” class; Cur-
rent version works only
on UDP; Cannot work
on encrypted traffic
TABLE VI
MAIN PROPERTIES OF THE CLASSIFIERS.
this is in principle similar to the pDPI case when signatures
need to be updated because of a change in the application-
layer protocol. In the other hand, statistical approaches such
as IPSVM that do not use topology-dependent features such
as inter-arrival times have shown that they can perform rea-
sonably well even when training information derived on one
network is then applied to a different one.
Our tests show that KISS is the best classifier with respect
to UDP P2PTV traffic. This is due both to the statistical
signatures and the adoption of endpoint-based algorithm (using
an approach similar to [18]), that reveals to be particularly
appropriate for peer-to-peer traffic in which many short flows
appear from/to the same endpoint over time. However, simi-
larly to DPI techniques, stochastic packet inspection fails in
case proper encryption is used by the applications, because all
the bits in the payload will assume random values. Another
problem relates to its use of a multi-class SVM classifier,
which requires the unknown class to be trained with samples
representative of all the possible protocols. As shown in the
operator trace, this could originate a large amount of false
positives when the protocol mix in the unknown class changes.
IPSVM proves to be effective too, although its accuracy is
mined by the higher percentages of false negatives considering
per-flow classifications. On the plus side, since the features
it is based on are packet size and transmission direction, in
principle it should be applicable also to encrypted traffic.
Our future work is proceeding in different directions. First,
we are working to improve KISS by making it amenable to
the analysis of TCP traffic. Second, we are studying how
to apply the concept of “endpoint classification” to both
pDPI and IPSVM. Third, we plan to verify if a majority-
vote approach, based on the combination of the responses of
different classifiers, could improve the overall accuracy of each
single approach. Finally, we want to extend this analysis by
comparing the memory and processing requirements of our
classifiers.
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